In recent years, many health maintenance organizations (HMOs)have exited the market for Medicare managed care; since 1998, the number of participating plans has fallen from 346 to 174. As a result of this reduced participation by HMOs, hundreds of thousands of Medicare beneficiaries have been involuntarily disenrolled from the program at the end of each year from 1998 to 2001. This paper estimates the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) capitation payments that are necessary to support the participation of various numbers of HMOs in Medicare managed care per county market. This paper does not make a normative statement about how many HMOs should be supported in this program; rather, it makes a positive statement about the levels of payment necessary to support various numbers of HMOs.
This paper estimates the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) capitation payments that are necessary to support the participation of various numbers of HMOs in Medicare managed care per county market. This paper does not make a normative statement about how many HMOs should be supported in this program; rather, it makes a positive statement about the levels of payment necessary to support various numbers of HMOs.
The identification strategy is to observe how the number of participating HMOs varies over counties and time in response to CMS payment, while controlling for estimated costs. This paper studies the period 1993-2001 and focuses in particular on the variation in payment, independent of costs, that occurred as a result of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which dramatically changed the way that HMOs are paid in this program. In light of the fact that it may not be cost-effective for CMS to support HMO participation in relatively rural or unpopulated counties, the sample used in this paper is limited to the 60 percent of U.S. counties with the largest populations of Medicare beneficiaries.
The ordered probit results presented in this paper indicate that, to support one Medicare HMO in 2001 in half of the counties in the sample, CMS would have to pay $682.08 per average enrollee per month in the marginal county. To support one Medicare HMO in 2001 in every county in the sample, CMS would need to pay $1,008.25 per enrollee per month in the maximum-payment county. For comparison, the maximum monthly payment paid by CMS to any county in 2001 was $833.55. This paper finds that 79.3 percent of counties in the sample received a CMS payment in 2001 that was less than what was necessary to support a single HMO in Medicare managed care. Compared to those counties that received a payment exceeding the estimated threshold for HMO participation, these counties are, on average, more rural and less populated, with citizens who are less wealthy and less educated. The relative disadvantage of rural and unpopulated counties persists three years after the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, designed in part to eliminate such disparities, took effect. 1 capitation payments that are necessary to support the participation of various numbers of HMOs in Medicare managed care per county market. This paper does not make a normative statement about how many HMOs should be supported in this program; rather, it makes a positive statement about the levels of payment necessary to support various numbers of HMOs.
The identi®cation strategy is to observe how the number of participating HMOs varies over counties and time in response to CMS payment, while controlling for estimated costs. This paper studies the period 1993±2001 and focuses in particular on the variation in payment, independent of costs, that occurred as a result of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which dramatically changed the way that HMOs are paid in this program. In light of the fact that it may not be cost-effective for CMS to support HMO participation in relatively rural or unpopulated counties, the sample used in this paper is limited to the 60 percent of U.S. counties with the largest populations of Medicare bene®ciaries.
The ordered probit results presented in this paper indicate that, to support one Medicare HMO in 2001 in half of the counties in the sample, CMS would have to pay $682.08 per average enrollee per month in the marginal county. To support one Medicare HMO in 2001 in every county in the sample, CMS would need to pay $1,008.25 per enrollee per month in the maximum-payment county. For comparison, the maximum monthly payment paid by CMS to any county in 2001 was $833.55. This paper ®nds that 79.3 percent of counties in the sample received a CMS payment in 2001 that was less than what was necessary to support a single HMO in Medicare managed care. Compared to those counties that received a payment exceeding the estimated threshold for HMO participation, these counties are, on average, more rural and less populated, with citizens who are less wealthy and less educated. The relative disadvantage of rural and unpopulated counties persists three years after the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, designed in part to eliminate such disparities, took effect.
I. Introduction
This paper studies how the equilibrium number of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) participating in county Medicare managed care markets varies with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) capitation payment. The number of HMOs participating in Medicare managed care markets is of interest for several reasons. The participation of a single HMO in a Medicare managed care market offers Medicare bene®ciaries in that market an alternative to fee-forservice care. The participation of multiple HMOs in a market creates competition for enrollment, which results in greater bene®ts and/or lower costs for managed care enrollees.
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This paper does not take a position on how many HMOs should be supported in this program in different areas of the United States; that question is left for policy makers. Instead, this paper seeks to provide the best estimate of the levels of payment necessary to support various numbers of HMOs.
The identi®cation strategy of this paper is to examine how the number of participating HMOs in this program varies over counties and time in response to CMS payment, controlling for estimated costs. In particular, variation in payment independent of costs occurs because of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which dramatically changed the way that HMOs are paid in this program.
Those eligible for Medicare Part A (Hospital Insurance) and enrolled in Medicare Part B (Supplementary Medical Insurance) may enroll in a Medicare managed care plan, if one is available.
3 Figure 1 .1 depicts the number of Medicare managed care enrollees from 1985 to 2001, a period during which enrollment grew from 0.44 million in 1985 to 6.35 million in 1999, before falling to 5.6 million in 2001. 4 In 2001, 15 percent of all Medicare bene®ciaries chose managed care. 5 The continuous growth in enrollment between 1985 and 1999 masks considerable change in the number of HMO plans participating in Medicare managed care. Figure 1 .2 shows that the number of participating plans rose considerably during the early and mid-1990s, but fell from 346 to 174 between 1998 and 2001. This fall in plan participation coincides with the period when the provisions of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 were in effect.
As a result of the reduced participation of HMOs, many Medicare bene®ciaries have been involuntarily disenrolled from the program. At the end of 1998, 407,000 (or 7 percent of all) Medicare HMO enrollees were involuntarily disenrolled, and 327,000 (5.3 percent) were involuntarily disenrolled at the end of 1999. 6 It is estimated that 934,000 enrollees (15.1 percent) were disenrolled at the end of the year 2000. 7 Bene®ciaries involuntarily disenrolled from a Medicare managed care plan are forced either to ®nd another HMO in their county with a risk contract from Medicare or to return to traditional fee-for-service Medicare. Laschober et al. (1999) surveyed Medicare bene®ciaries whose HMO had recently withdrawn from Medicare. They found that one-third experienced a decline in bene®ts, 39 percent reported higher monthly premiums, and one in seven lost prescription drug coverage.
It may not be cost-effective for CMS to support HMO participation in Medicare managed care in relatively rural or unpopulated counties; for this reason, the sample used in this paper is limited to the 60 percent of U.S. counties with the largest population of Medicare bene®ciaries. Our estimates indicate that 79.3 percent of counties in this sample received a CMS payment less than what was necessary to support a single HMO in the Medicare managed care market. In particular, CMS appears to underestimate the payment necessary to support HMOs in rural and less populous areas. Section II of this paper outlines the methodology for examining the relationship between CMS payment rates and the extent of HMO participation. Section III describes the data used in this study; Section IV presents the results of the empirical work, and the ®nal section presents our conclusions.
II. Methodology
To illustrate why higher payments may lead to a larger number of participating HMOs, suppose that the Medicare managed care market is in equilibrium, and then CMS raises the payment to HMOs while costs remain constant. The payment has been raised above the marginal cost of caring for additional Medicare bene®ciaries, so HMOs will compete to increase enrollment and therefore pro®ts. HMOs compete for enrollment by increasing bene®ts (and, therefore, marginal and average costs). The provision of additional bene®ts raises the cost curves; in particular, the average cost curve will rise to equal the new, higher payment. The provision of additional bene®ts makes Medicare managed care more attractive relative to fee-for-service Medicare; this shifts the demand curve for Medicare managed care and, as a result, the new equilibrium will be associated with a higher quantity of enrollment. Since marginal costs are rising in enrollment, the higher enrollment may be associated with a larger number of participating HMOs and cannot be associated with fewer participating HMOs.
Congress, in the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997, changed CMS's formula for setting payment levels effective in 1998. Prior to 1998, county CMS payments were set according to the 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA). Under TEFRA, HMOs were paid 95 percent of the projected average fee-for-service costs of Medicare bene®ciaries in that county, multiplied by a risk-adjustment factor based on the enrollee's age, sex, Medicaid eligibility, institutional status, and working status.
The TEFRA payment formula was criticized for overpaying HMOs. Despite the strategy of paying HMOs 95 percent of projected average fee-for-service costs, several studies concur that it cost CMS more to enroll bene®ciaries in managed care than if they had remained in fee-for-service Medicare. The reason is that enrollees in Medicare managed care have proven to be systematically healthier than fee-forservice Medicare bene®ciaries. As a result, the medical expenses of the Medicare managed care enrollees were far lower than 95 percent of average fee-for-service costs. 8 The TEFRA payment formula was also criticized for creating disparities in payments across counties; in particular, few HMOs entered rural counties. It was argued that tying managed care payments to local fee-for-service charges rewarded counties that were inef®cient at providing fee-for-service care and counties with high reimbursements for graduate medical education, which are included in the fee-for-service costs.
Concerned about the rising cost of caring for Medicare bene®ciaries, Congress passed the BBA of 1997, which created the Medicare 1 Choice program (M1C) and changed the way that HMOs are reimbursed for risk contracts. 9 Under M1C, CMS, beginning in 1998, pays HMOs the greatest of the following three rates 10 :
1. A blend of an input-price adjusted national rate and an area-speci®c rate; however, if total projected payments exceed a budget limit, this blended rate is reduced. The blend is intended to reduce the variation in payments across counties by increasing the lowest rates and decreasing the highest rates.
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2. A minimum or ª¯oorº payment, adjusted annually, intended to increase rates in historically lower-rate counties where Medicare managed care plans generally have not been offered.
3. A minimum increase over the previous year's payment, which is intended to protect high payment areas. For 1998 For , 1999 , and January and February of 1999, the minimum increase over the previous year's payment was 2 percent. Since March 2001, the minimum increase is 3 percent.
Since the BBA took effect, the budget limits have typically been binding, forcing reductions in the blended rate. These reductions have been so great that only in the year 2000 did any county receive the blended payment. The BBA also affected HMO pro®ts by increasing their administrative burdens and charging them user fees (which amounted to $95 million in both 1998 and 1999), the proceeds of which are used to inform Medicare bene®ciaries about their managed care options.
There is one ®nal component of CMS payments to HMOs. The Balanced Budget Re®nement Act of 1999 mandates that CMS, starting in the year 2000, pay bonuses of 5 percent the ®rst year and 3 percent the second year to HMOs that offer Medicare1Choice in previously unserved counties.
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Three studies have modeled the decisions of individual HMOs to participate in the Medicare managed care market (Adamache and Rossiter 1986 , Porell and Wallack 1990 , and Abraham et al. 2000 . Each of these studies used HMO-level data, which entails two complicated problems, neither of which is addressed by the three referenced studies.
The ®rst problem is that, in counties with noncompetitive Medicare managed care markets, the entry decision of each ®rm is a function of the entry decisions of all potential participants in that market. Complicating the problem is that some potential participants are not observed because they chose not to enter.
The second problem inherent in the use of HMO-level data to study this problem is the likelihood of multiple equilibria. For example, a county may be able to support two HMOs in its Medicare managed care market, but it may be random which two HMOs participate. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a) show that multiple equilibria occur in simultaneous-move models under very general conditions.
In this paper, we study the aggregate number of HMOs participating at the county level. This avoids the problems of simultaneity and multiple equilibria because we are concerned only with the number of ®rms that can be supported in the county, not the identities of the individual HMOs.
In our focus on the number of ®rms that can be supported in distinct geographic markets, our paper is similar to an earlier literature that includes Bresnahan and Reiss (1987 ; ; Kronick, Goodman, Wennberg, and Wagner (1993); . 12 However, we differ from this literature because our regressor of interest is not the market size but the market ªprice.º
We follow the methodology developed in Bresnahan and Reiss (1987 in using a latent pro®t variable to motivate the use of an ordered probit to study the number of ®rms that can be supported in a geographic market. We assume that pro®t has an additively separable unobserved component, represented by an error term. It is assumed that the error term is normally distributed, independent across markets and independent of the regressors. We assume that all HMOs in the same market have the same unobserved pro®t. These assumptions permit the use of the ordered probit to estimate entry thresholds. The dependent variable is the number of HMOs participating in Medicare managed care in a county.
We estimate the latent pro®t function using a reduced form approach. Cameron and Trivedi (1998) conclude that when the data generating process is a continuous latent variable (in our case unobserved pro®ts), an ordered model should be used in place of a count data regression model. 13 Accordingly, we estimate our model using an ordered probit regression. The number of participating HMOs in a given county in a given year is regressed on payment and the factors that affect variable costs, market size, the probability of enrollment, and ®xed costs.
Ordered probit regression will provide us with threshold values of CMS payments for HMO participation. If b P represents the ordered probit coef®cient on CMS payment, b represents the vector of all other ordered probit coef®cients, and X represents the set of regressors other than the CMS payment, then P N , the minimum CMS payment needed to support the participation of N HMOs, is:
where l N is the cutoff in the ordered probit regression associated with N HMOs. 14 We predict that a higher CMS payment, controlling for observable factors that affect costs, will be associated with the participation of a greater number of HMOs.
III. Data
This section explains how we control for each component of the pro®t function introduced in the previous section. The data used in this paper come from two sources. CMS is the source for data on Medicare managed care enrollment, Medicare managed care contracts with HMOs, CMS payments by county, and input price indices. The second major source of data for this paper is the Area Resource File (ARF), which provides medical and demographic data at the county level. 15 The unit of observation in this paper is the county. A market has traditionally been de®ned as a region in which a single price prevails for a homogenous good. 16 By this de®nition, counties represent distinct markets for Medicare managed care; CMS sets Medicare managed care payments on a county-by-county basis. Furthermore, CMS requires separate contracts from HMOs for each county in which they wish to offer Medicare managed care.
For the purposes of this study, a risk plan is de®ned as participating in a county Medicare managed care market if CMS market penetration ®les indicate that the plan has enrolled at least 0.5 percent of the county's Medicare-eligible residents. 17 We exclude plans that have enrolled less than 0.5 percent of eligible residents because plans with such low county enrollment may not actually be operating in the county. CMS market penetration ®les list enrollees by their county of residence instead of the county in which they have enrolled in an HMO; as a result, many plan enrollees are found in counties where the plan does not have a contract to operate.
The number of HMOs participating in a county, by year, is shown in table 1.1. lation of Medicare bene®ciaries. The table shows that counties in the ®fth (most populous) quintile are several times more likely to have a participating HMO than are counties in the ®rst quintile (least populous). Many counties are too rural or unpopulated ever to support HMO participation, so we exclude these counties from the sample. Thus, their history of nonparticipation does not in¯uence the payment thresholds estimated for other counties. The sample used in this paper consists of counties whose population of Medicare bene®ciaries is in the top three quintiles; in other words, its 1990 Medicare population was at least 2,783. In addition, all counties in Alaska and Hawaii are excluded.
The sample contains observations of these counties for each year from 1993 to 2001. Plan-county data are aggregated to the HMO level and HMO-level data are aggregated to the county level. 18 The dependent variable used in this paper is the number of HMOs participating in a county in a given year. In ordered probit regressions, this dependent variable is top-coded at six or more.
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The HMO Pro®t Function
The pro®t function for all HMOs in a market is:
where P is the CMS payment, AVC is the average variable cost function, d is the probability of enrollment in Medicare managed care of the representative Medicare eligible, S is the number of Medicare eligibles, r is the interest rate, F is the ®xed cost of entry, and e represents unobserved pro®ts. Listed below are the variables we use to proxy for each of the components of the pro®t function.
P: Payment
The regressor of interest is the CMS per-enrollee, per-month payment speci®c to the county. We enter the CMS payment directly and interact it with an indicator for the BBA regime (1998±2001), which allows the effect of the CMS payment to vary before and after the BBA of 1997 took effect. These payment variables include bonuses, paid only in 2000 and 2001, which are equal to 5 percent of the per-enrollee payment for the ®rst year, and 3 percent of the per-enrollee payment for the second year, that an HMO operates in a previously unserved county.
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Although in practice the per-capita payments of CMS to HMOs are adjusted to take into account the demographic and (more recently) risk factors associated with the enrollee, we do not make these adjustments. Thus, the payment used in our empirical work represents the payment for the average enrollee. 
AVC: Average Variable Costs
We do not observe the average variable costs of HMOs; we estimate these costs in the following way. We assume that average variable costs in county c in year t, denoted AVC c,t , have the following structure: regression model, Part A and Part B costs will be entered separately. HMOs may be better able to control one type of costs than the other, and therefore costs in the two areas may have different effects on the likelihood that HMOs will participate. In the average variable costs equation listed above, X c is a vector of county characteristics that may affect costs, speci®cally, the number of general practitioners in 1990, the number of registered nurses in 1990, the number of hospitals in 1993, and median rent in 1990. 24 We also include as regressors population density and the percentage of the population that is urban because geographically dispersed populations may be more costly to serve. Finally, year-speci®c costs are captured by I t , an indicator variable that equals 1 if the observation is for year t.
S: Size of the Market
Although the sample is limited to relatively populous counties, even within that group, HMOs may prefer to enter more populous counties. We control for the size of the county market using the number of Medicare bene®ciaries in the county in 1990. 25 We also include the percentage change in this number from 1980 to 1990 to account for the fact that HMOs may prefer to enter growing markets.
F: Fixed Costs of Entry
We control for two factors that Brown and Gold (1999) suggest affect the ®xed costs of entry into the Medicare managed care market. The ®rst is whether the HMO already operates in the commercial market in the county. This may affect the ®xed costs of entering Medicare managed care for two reasons: (1) the HMO would have already sunk the costs of establishing a network of health care providers in the county (that is, there may be economies of scope to participating in multiple managed care markets in the same county), (2) CMS limits participation in the Medicare managed care market to HMOs participating in the county's commercial market. HMOs that historically participated in the commercial market of the county may face lower barriers to entering the Medicare managed care market.
We do not simply control for the number of HMOs participating in the county's commercial managed care market. Because an HMO could enter a county's commercial market for the purpose of subsequently entering its Medicare managed care market, current participation in the commercial market may be endogenous. Instead, we control for the number of HMOs in the county in 1980, before the TEFRA of 1982 created the modern Medicare managed care market. 26 We also control for the likelihood of HMOs participating in the county commercial market using the percentage of the workforce in manufacturing or white-collar jobs in 1990. The presence of these types of workers proxies for the presence of employers likely to demand commercial managed care for its employees.
The second factor that affects the ®xed cost of entering a county Medicare managed care market is whether an HMO participates in nearby counties. It may be cheaper for an HMO to enter a county adjacent to its current service area because the HMO may already be familiar with local providers and have acquired information about the local market. To proxy for the likelihood of participating in adjacent counties, we control for the total number of Medicare bene®ciaries in 1990 in all adjacent counties and its percentage growth from 1980 to 1990.
d: Probability That Medicare Eligibles Will Enroll in Medicare Managed Care
It has been found repeatedly that relatively healthy Medicare bene®ciaries are the most likely to enroll in managed care. 27 To capture cross-county differences in the proportion of healthy bene®ciaries (and therefore demand for Medicare managed care), we control for per capita income, the poverty rate among the county's elderly, the percentage of adults with a high school diploma, and the percentage of adults with a college degree.
28 Each of these variables was measured in 1990. Summary statistics for the sample used in this paper appear in table 1.4.
We acknowledge that characteristics of the individual HMOs participating in the market may affect variable or ®xed costs, or the triggers at which the HMO will enter or exit. For example, certain model types may be more ef®cient at providing care and the exit trigger may be lower for nonpro®t than for for-pro®t HMOs. We ignore the characteristics of the individual participating HMOs for two reasons. First, these characteristics are endogenous. An HMO may change its model type or pro®t status to suit the characteristics of the markets in which it participates. Second, as mentioned earlier, HMO entry into Medicare managed care is an example of a multiple-agent discrete-move game. It is likely that multiple equilibria exist and that the number of ®rms participating is determined, but the identity of the individual HMOs that participate is to some extent random. 
IV. Empirical Results
The results of the ordered probit regression of the number of HMOs participating in Medicare managed care at the county level are presented in table 1.5. In all the results reported in this paper, standard errors are cluster-corrected to account for the dependence in errors within each county over time. The coef®cients on CMS payment and CMS payment interacted with the BBA regime are positive and statistically signi®cant at the 1 percent level, which is consistent with our hypothesis that, controlling for costs, a higher payment is associated with the participation of more HMOs. As described in Section II, the coef®cients presented in table 1.5 can be used to calculate the CMS payments necessary to support a given number of HMOs in the market. Each county has unique thresholds needed to support given numbers of HMOs in this program. Rather than report the thresholds associated with over 2,000 counties, table 1.6 lists the payment thresholds associated with counties at the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 100th percentiles for payment threshold. Table 1 .6 indicates that to support a single HMO in the median county in the sample, it is necessary for CMS to pay $682.08 per average enrollee per month in the median county. To support a single HMO in every county of the sample, CMS would have to pay $1,008.25 per average enrollee per month in the maximum-payment county. Table 1 .6 also lists the CMS payment thresholds necessary to support multiple HMOs in county Medicare managed care markets. CMS may desire multiple HMOs in each market because the competition between the HMOs for market share leads to lower out-of-pocket costs and additional bene®ts for enrollees. Table 1 .6 suggests that, conditional on two HMOs already participating, CMS must pay roughly $115 more per enrollee per month to support each additional Medicare HMO.
Although we report our estimated thresholds to the cent, we do not claim absolute precision about the estimates. The exact threshold is determined in part by assumptions, such as the functional form of regression. The standard errors, which appear in parentheses below the thresholds in table 1.6, in some cases imply large con®dence intervals. Derivation of standard errors for the thresholds is dif®cult because the thresholds are nonlinear functions of several random variables. Accordingly, we calculate bootstrap standard errors. Speci®cally, bootstrap samples of size equal to the overall sample are formed by randomly selecting, with replacement from the overall sample, all observations of a particular county. The standard errors are calculated from the variance observed in the thresholds calculated using the bootstrapped samples. We follow the recommendation of Efron and Tibshirani (1993) and conduct 200 replications to estimate standard errors. Table 1 .7 compares the mean characteristics of two groups of counties: those in which CMS payments in the year 2001 were more than the estimated payment necessary for one HMO to participate in the county, and those in which CMS payments were less than that threshold. The table also lists the difference in means and the t statistic associated with the test of the hypothesis that the means are equal across the two groups of counties.
In the year 2001, 381 counties in the sample were assigned CMS payments that exceeded the estimated payment necessary to support one HMO, while 1,463 counties were assigned payments less than the single-HMO threshold. Table 1 .7 indicates that counties assigned payments greater than the estimated single-HMO threshold have both higher CMS payments and higher Part A and B Medicare costs than the counties assigned payments less than the threshold. In addition, the counties with above-threshold payments have many more hospitals and general practitioners and, in general, have better educated and wealthier populations. Each of these differences is statistically signi®cant at the 1 percent signi®cance level. Perhaps the most dramatic difference is in the size of the Medicare population: counties assigned payments greater than the estimated single-HMO threshold have on average a Medicare bene®ciary population of almost 51,900, whereas counties assigned payments less than that threshold have on average a Medicare bene-®ciary population of only about 8,000. If a below-threshold current payment can be interpreted as an underestimate by CMS of costs in that county, then our results suggest that CMS tends to underestimate the costs of HMO participation in sparsely populated counties. Several studies noted that, under the TEFRA payment scheme that was used prior to 1998, rural counties were particularly unlikely to be served by HMOs.
29 Passage of the BBA was intended to eliminate such disparities by raising payments more quickly in low-payment than in high-payment counties. We ®nd that even three years after the BBA took effect, counties with CMS payment insuf®cient to support HMO participation tend to be far less populous than counties that receive what we estimate to be suf®cient payment. This pattern is found in a sample that includes only those counties with a Medicare population large enough to be considered viable for HMO activity in this program.
V. Conclusion
At the end of 1998, 1999, and 2000, HMO exits from Medicare managed care markets resulted in the involuntary disenrollment of hundreds of thousands of elderly and disabled Americans from a program that was intended to generate additional bene®ts for bene®ciaries and savings for Medicare. This paper estimates the CMS payments necessary to support the participation in Medicare managed care of a given number of HMOs per county market. Ordered probit estimates suggest that, to support one Medicare HMO in half of U.S. counties in our sample in 2001, CMS would have to pay $682.08 per average enrollee per month in the marginal county. To support one Medicare HMO in every county in the sample in the year 2001, CMS would need to pay $1,008.25 per enrollee per month in the maxi-20. We determine whether each county is eligible for a bonus by checking the Medicare Managed Care geographic service area reports to see whether any HMO had a risk contract with CMS to serve the county the previous calendar year. 21 . Demographic and risk adjustments are uniform across counties.
22. The Hospital Input Price Index tracks changes in the prices of hospital inputs such as wages, salaries, bene®ts, professional fees, utilities, liability insurance, pharmaceuticals, food, chemicals, medical instruments, photographic supplies, rubber and plastics, paper products, apparel, machinery and equipment, and other inputs.
23. The Medicare Economic Index tracks changes in the prices of inputs to physician-provided care such as physician compensation, nonphysician compensation, of®ce expenses, medical materials and supplies, liability insurance, medical equipment, and other expenses.
24. The source of the data on the number of doctors is the American Medical Association Physician Master®le, and that for the number of hospitals is the American Hospital Association Survey of Hospitals.
25. The number of Medicare bene®ciaries includes both elderly and disabled bene®ciaries (both are eligible for managed care). In 1998, the elderly represented 87.06 percent of all Medicare bene®ciaries.
26. The source of the data on commercial HMO historic participation is the National HMO Census of Prepaid Plans.
27. Chapter 15 of Physician Payment Review Commission (1996) summarizes the literature that ®nds Medicare bene®ciaries who enroll in managed care, compared to those who remain in fee-for-service Medicare, tend to have had lower utilization and Medicare costs in the preceding few years. See also General Accounting Of®ce Report 97-160 (1997a) . A similar difference in prior utilization characterizes those who enroll in commercial managed care plans; see the summary in Glied (2000) . Possible reasons that the relatively healthy are more likely to enroll in managed care are that they are less likely to have an established health care provider and that they may be less averse to the risk that HMOs may deny them certain treatments.
28. We assume that the per-capita income and education of Medicare bene®ciaries track those of the entire adult population in the county. The source of data on the poverty rate among the elderly is the Small Area Income Poverty estimates from the Bureau of the Census and that for per-capita income is the U.S. Department of Commerce.
29. See, for example, Serrato, Brown, and Bergeron (1995) .
